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I.

INTRODUCTION

T
W
I

he use of force against armed groups located in other States is not new,
but began receiving heightened attention as a result of U.S. operations in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The high profile of these
events, the resoluteness with which the United States asserted its right to selfdefense against an armed group and the international support that it received,1
all led to increased attention to the surrounding legal matters. Much of the
debate centered upon the basic question whether a State has a right to selfdefense in response to attacks perpetrated by a non-State actor located in the
territory of another State, absent attribution of the attack to the other State.
Separate questions that arose were over the classification of hostilities between the State and such a group, and the rules governing the conduct of the
parties.
Over a decade later, these fundamental questions are returning with a
vengeance, while the unfolding of current events presents a myriad of new
and far more complex challenges to our understanding of the law and how it
should apply in these situations. In particular, the notion of a single armed
group in a defined location has given way to concepts of a conflict simultaneously engaging multiple groups across numerous territories. As a result, debates have emerged over issues such as extending self-defense into multiple
territories, defining the scope of the battlefield, and over terms such as “associated forces” in the context of armed groups. This article sets out to draw
together the threads of these debates from the last fifteen years, to analyze
new questions that have emerged, examine how they impact upon each other
and suggest a way forward for overcoming the legal challenges.

1. See Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations,
Letter dated Oct. 7, 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001); Press Release 124, NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic
Council (Sept. 12, 2001); see also Organization of American States, Support for the Measures
of Individual and Collective Self-Defense Established in Resolution Rc.24/Res. 1/01, Doc.
Oea/Ser.F/Ii.24 Cs/Tiar/Res. 1/01 (Oct. 16, 2001).
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II.

SELF-DEFENSE

A. Self-Defense against Non-State Actors
Much of this early analysis used the starting point in which State A (Angosia)
engages in forcible operations against a non-State armed group (the Veridians) located in State B (Betazed). This is a useful starting point for the current examination prior to opening up the Pandora’s Box of multiple groups
and territories. Many of the points that will arise later cannot be examined
without first addressing the underlying point of contention: whether there
exists a right to self-defense against non-State actors operating from the territory of another State. If attacks by the non-State actor are attributable to
the State from whose territory it operates, then the issues would be of the
more familiar variety of self-defense and use of force between States.
It is in situations when such attribution does not exist that the more vociferous debates emerge.2 Although there is as yet no consensus on the matter, there is strong reason for the view that States can invoke the right to
self-defense following an armed attack by an independent non-State actor
operating from outside their borders. This view has support in a textual reading of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which does not mention the nature of
the entity that commits the armed attack. Moreover, to deprive a State of the
right to respond based on the identity of the attacker goes against the very
notion that States have the inherent right to defend themselves.3 While there

2. For a range of views over the years, see Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective SelfDefense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 872, 878 (1947); Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 227, 233 (2003); Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force against Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 309, 311 (1988); Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force
by States in Self-Defence 55 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 963 (2006);
Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?,
99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62, 64, 67–70 (2005); NOAM LUBELL,
EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS chs.1–3 (2010); KENNETH WATKIN, FIGHTING AT THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES: CONTROLLING THE USE OF
FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT 50–54 (2016); Nico Schrijver & Larissa van den
Herik, Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter-terrorism and International Law, 57 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 531, ¶ 38 (2010), https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/42298.
3. Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the “War against Terrorism,” 78 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 301, 307 (2002)
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remains disagreement over the relevance of self-defense absent attribution
of the attack to a State (in particular due to the lack of clarity of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) position),4 the notion has growing support in
State practice and in legal analysis.5 The most recent evidence of this support
is found in the position of a significant number of States in their letters to
the Security Council regarding action taken against the Islamic State in Syrian
territory.6 While the precise wording differs and some letters offer claims of
Since the events of 11 September showed—if, indeed, the matter were ever in any doubt—
that a terrorist organization operating outside the control of any State is capable of causing
death and destruction on a scale comparable with that of regular military action by a State,
it would be a strange formalism which regarded the right to take military action against
those who caused or threatened such consequences as dependent upon whether their acts
could somehow be imputed to a State.

4. In the Wall opinion, the ICJ appeared to have limited self-defense to attacks by
States. However, the same paragraph can equally be read in the particular context of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which the Court was referring to attacks emanating from occupied territory, which is very different to attacks coming from another State’s territory over
which the attacked State has no control. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 139 (July
9); id. at 219, ¶ 35 (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.); id. at 240, ¶ 6 (declaration of Buergenthal, J.). Moreover, in the later Armed Activities case the Court appeared to leave open the
question of the possibility of self-defense following attacks by independent non-State actors.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶¶ 146–47 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities].
5. Committee on The Use of Force, International Law Association, Draft Report on
Aggression and the Use of Force (Feb. 2017) (on file with author); Schrijver & van den
Herik, supra note 2.
6. See Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the U.N., Letter
dated Mar. 31, 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2015/221 (Mar. 31, 2015) [hereinafter Canada Letter]; Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the U.N., Letter dated July 24, 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/563 (July 24, 2015) [hereinafter Turkey Letter];
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 7, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/688 (Sept. 8, 2015); Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from
the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter
United States Letter]; Permanent Representative of Australia to the U.N., Letter dated Sept.
9, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/693 (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter
Australia Letter]; Permanent Representative of France to the U.N., Identical letters dated
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collective self-defense, by supporting Iraq’s right to self-defense against the
Islamic State in Syrian territory they are providing recognition of self-defense
action against an armed group in another State.
Once the right to invoke self-defense is accepted in principle, the conditions for the exercise of this right must come to the foreground, and it is
here that much of the discussion in recent years has been centered. As with
any instance of self-defense, the principles of military necessity and proportionality must be respected.7 During the past decade, there has been much
talk of a supposed new condition for the exercise of self-defense against
armed groups, termed the “unwilling or unable” test.8 This approach requires
that the territorial State (Betazed in the above scenario) be either unwilling
or unable to prevent the armed attacks conducted by the non-State actor in
its territory. The use of the unwilling or unable standard has been criticized
for being an unwarranted expansion of the long-standing recognized confines of self-defense.9
The debate over this issue risks creating a misguided perception that the
notion of unwilling or unable might be presented as a new test under the jus
ad bellum designed to replace existing law. This description is inaccurate; rather, if correctly applied, it should be seen as a component within the preSept. 8, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/745
(Sept. 9, 2015); Permanent Representative of Denmark to the U.N., Letter dated Jan. 11,
2016 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/34 (Jan. 13, 2016); Permanent
Representative of Norway to the U.N., Letter dated June 3, 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/513 (June 3, 2016); Permanent Representative of Belgium to
the U.N., Letter dated June 7, 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/523
(June 9, 2016).
7. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J
Rep. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 176 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; Armed Activities, supra note 4, ¶ 147.
8. See Australia Letter, supra note 6; Canada Letter, supra note 6, Turkey Letter, supra
note 6, United States Letter, supra note 6. For a detailed examination of this issue, see Ashley
Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extra-Territorial Self-Defense, 52
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 483 (2012); see also Kimberly N. Trapp, Actorpluralism, the “Turn to Responsibility” and the Jus ad Bellum: “Unwilling or Unable” in Context, 2
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (2015).
9. Olivier Corten, The “Unwilling or Unable” Test: Has it Been, and Could it be, Accepted?, 29
LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 777 (2016).
219

International Law Studies

2017

existing necessity principle. In other words, if Angosia wishes to exercise the
right to self-defense against the Veridian group in Betazed, it can only do so
in response to an armed attack and in a manner consistent with the principles
of necessity and proportionality. The principle of necessity can be read as
indicating that force in self-defense must be a last resort.10 If Betazed is willing and able to prevent the attacks by the Veridian group, then there is no
necessity for Angosia to take forcible measures. The unwilling or unable test
is not a new or alternative route for widening the required conditions for
exercise of self-defense; if anything, it is an additional limitation within the
test of necessity that must be observed when claiming the right of self-defense against armed groups in the territory of another State. Moreover, if the
action taken by Angosia goes beyond what is necessary and proportionate in
the prevention of attacks by the Veridian group, it would cease to be justified
by self-defense.11
Objections to the unwilling or unable test can rest on a number of
grounds. First, there is a question of the subjective element in determining
whether Betazed was indeed unwilling or unable. However, this type of question could equally be asked in any determination of necessity for self-defense, even in the “old-fashioned” self-defense directly between States. Ultimately, it will be for the State acting in self-defense to be able to make a
convincing case—whether at an early stage or later on before the Security
Council or the ICJ—that there was a necessity for it to act in self-defense.
In cases of armed groups operating from other States, the case will invariably
include the unwillingness or inability of the territorial State to prevent the
attacks. Moreover, rather than requiring a lengthy analysis of whether
Betazed was deliberately unwilling or whether it simply did not have the capacity to act against the armed group, the deciding factor will be whether
Betazed, given the chance, was taking effective action to stop the attacks by
the armed group. If the armed attacks by the Veridian group against Angosia
continue despite attempts to resolve the matter through Betazed, then
whether this was a result of unwillingness or the inability of Betazed would
not alter the necessity of Angosia to take action in self-defense.
Another objection to the notion of unwilling or unable—in particular in
cases of “unable”—rests upon the fact that it creates situations in which
Betazed, through no fault of its own, might be subjected to armed force on
10. JAMES A. GREEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SELF-DEFENCE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 76–80 (2009).
11. Committee on The Use of Force, supra note 5.
220

Fragmented Wars

Vol. 93

its territory by another State. In other words, it decouples the breach of territorial sovereignty from the responsibility for the armed attack, and allows
a State to be subjected to the former absent attribution to it of the latter.
This is a valid concern, especially for States with limited military capacity and
with less influence in the international system.12 In such cases, the best solution would be for them to cooperate with international efforts—whether
directly with other States affected by the armed group, or through the Security Council and regional organizations—to prevent the actions of the armed
group from occurring within their territory. If they choose not to do so, or
if these efforts fail to prevent the armed group from continuing to carry out
armed attacks against other States, there will inevitably come a point at which
one must choose between Angosia’s right to defend itself from armed attacks, and Betazed’s right to be free from force on its territory. As concluded
earlier, States must be able to defend themselves from armed attacks, even
if the attack emanates from a non-State actor and is not attributable to the
territorial State. In such circumstances, rather than representing a widening
of self-defense, “the unwilling or unable test is a critical element that narrows
the situations in which it is lawful to use force in another State’s territory.”13
Simply put, the debate over the legitimacy of the unwilling or unable test
is, in fact, a proxy for the real question as to whether self-defense can be
invoked against an armed group in the territory of another State absent attribution to the territorial State. Arguments against the use of an unwilling
or unable standard are coupled with a position rejecting self-defense in such
circumstances. If one takes the position that Angosia cannot take action in
self-defense to halt armed attacks by the Veridian group on Betazed’s territory, even if the latter will not or cannot prevent the attacks, this is for all
intents and purposes the same as completely denying the right to self-defense
against independent armed groups operating from other States. The position
taken here is that the UN Charter recognizes that the inherent right of selfdefense carves out a limited exception to the prohibition on the use of force,
and that this right is not dependent on the identity of the attacker but on the
existence of an armed attack, and that its exercise is limited by the test of
necessity.14 Should the territorial State be willing and able to stop the armed
12. Dawood I. Ahmed, Defending Weak States Against the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine of
Self-Defense, 9 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1
(2013).
13. Deeks, supra note 8, at 547–48.
14. In addition to necessity, the principle of proportionality must also be observed. See
supra text accompanying note 7.
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attacks, such necessity would not exist and the right of self-defense cannot
be exercised.
B. Expanding Self-Defense into New States
Let us assume for now that Angosia has already engaged in forcible operations against the Veridian group in the territory of Betazed, and that the justification given was one of self-defense following attacks against Angosia
launched by the Veridian group from the territory of Betazed. As noted
above, the underlying question of a right to self-defense against an armed
group is only the first step in a lengthy list of legal complexities when dealing
with fragmented multi-territorial situations. The next question is whether
Angosia can also use force against cells of the Veridian group located in the
neighboring State of Cardassia (and Davlos and beyond). For the time being
we shall set aside the matter of fractured and multiple armed groups, and
assume that the Veridian group in Betazed and the Veridian group in Cardassia are part of a clear single whole operating under a unified command
and control structure overseeing all the groups’ operations in Betazed and
Cardassia.
Angosia has already invoked self-defense and has begun operations
against the Veridian group in the territory of Betazed. It might therefore
argue that its right to resort to force has already been put to the test and
operations against the Veridian group can proceed beyond Betazed and into
Cardassia (or anywhere else) with no additional barriers.15 Such an argument,
however, is misguided. The right of self-defense in international law has two
15. The U.S. position with regard to operations against al-Qaida is more nuanced and
leaves room for interpretation in more than one way:
Once a State has lawfully resorted to force in self-defense against a particular actor in response to an actual or imminent armed attack by that group, it is not necessary as a matter
of international law to reassess whether an armed attack is occurring or imminent prior to
every subsequent action taken against that group, provided that hostilities have not ended.
In addition, in armed conflicts with non-State actors that are prone to shifting operations
from country to country, the United States does not view its ability to use military force
against a non-State actor with which it is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict as limited
to “hot” battlefields. This does not mean the United States can strike wherever it chooses:
the use of force in self-defense in an ongoing armed conflict is limited by respect for States’
sovereignty and the considerations discussed above, including the customary international
law requirements of necessity and proportionality when force could implicate the rights of
other States.

THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE
UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 11 (2016).
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underpinning motives. First, it serves to establish that a State that suffers an
armed attack must, within the limits of necessity and proportionality, be able
to take forcible action to defend itself. As discussed previously, this is increasingly understood as including cases in which a non-State actor operating
from abroad perpetrated the armed attack; otherwise, it would mean that
States suffering such attacks are deprived of the ability to defend themselves
in cases where force is the only way to do so.
Self-defense, however, plays an additional role in the international legal
order; it is a form of exception to the prohibition on use of force between
States. As such, it provides a guarantee to States that, subject to rare exceptions, they will be protected from the use of force by other States. Accordingly, even if a non-State actor perpetrated the armed attack, the inter-State
aspect must also be considered.16 In other words, the invocation of self-defense does not occur in a single State vacuum, but is designed to govern a
situation in which a State seeks justification for its use of force affecting
another State. The fact that the armed attack that triggered the invocation
was carried out by a non-State actor does not alter this aspect of the selfdefense doctrine as one that regulates the use of force across State borders.
The earlier discussion of self-defense against armed groups demonstrated the tension between the competing objectives of self-defense, resolving it in favor of allowing self-defense.17 The new scenario involving Cardassia presents an altogether different picture. Angosia may have justifiably
invoked self-defense in response to an armed attack by the Veridian group
and passed the tests of necessity and proportionality allowing it to take action
on the territory of Betazed. However, the initial invocation of self-defense
will have governed the matter of whether Angosia can use force only inside
Betazed, having considered Betazed’s action or inaction to prevent these attacks. Even if the Veridian group has a presence in Cardassia, asserting that
force can be used on Cardassia’s territory with no regard to anything other
than previous actions involving Angosia, Betazed and the Veridian group
would blatantly disregard Cardassia’s sovereign rights. Cardassia’s right to be
protected from a violation of its borders remains intact unless proven oth-

16. Claus Kreß, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing Transnational
Armed Conflicts, 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 245, 251 (2010).
17. For a discussion of unwilling or unable, see supra text accompanying notes 8–9. For
an analysis of unwilling or unable in light of evolving approaches to the use of force under
the UN Charter, see Trapp, supra note 8.
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erwise. If Angosia wishes to use unilateral force in Cardassia’s territory without Cardassia’s consent, it must make a self-defense case in relation to Cardassia.18
This conclusion is not altered by the fact that there may already be an
armed conflict between Angosia and the Veridian group in which certain
members of the Veridian group are considered to have lost protection from
attack under the jus in bello, even if this armed conflict already has an extraterritorial element through operations in Betazed. The rules of jus ad bellum
must be adhered to when claiming a right to expand the force into the territory of a new State. Accordingly, there is a need to identify the criteria beyond the pre-existing situation with the Veridian group in Betazed to determine whether Angosia would be justified in using force on Cardassia’s territory. As Angosia did with Betazed, if it is to assert the right to use force in
the territory of Cardassia, it can only do so based on self-defense. Self-defense, in turn, can only be invoked in response to an armed attack.
Clearly, if the Cardassia-based Veridian group is carrying out armed attacks directly from Cardassia’s territory (e.g., launching rockets or sending
large numbers of fighters), the analysis would proceed along the lines described earlier in relation to Betazed. However, it is also possible that a physical location from which an armed attack is launched might not be the same
as the location in which the self-defense measures must take place. For example, while attacks between States could be launched from a submarine in
a remote part of the seas, the victim-State may justifiably direct its self-defense at the military naval command inside the attacking State. Likewise, Angosia’s claim to self-defense would not be limited to situations such as a new
set of missiles being fired from the territory of Cardassia, and could involve
a wider set of circumstances.
One possible scenario is that ongoing attacks, or imminent attacks if anticipatory self-defense is accepted,19 are coming from Betazed, but in which
the Cardassia-based Veridian group is playing a crucial role. For example, if
the commanders of the Veridian group were located in Cardassia but directly
coordinating the attacks and movements of the Veridian group in Betazed,
they would be effectively controlling the attack. If the attacks emanating
18. Kreß, supra note 16, at 251; Christof Heyns, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 89, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (Sept. 13,
2013); Marko Milanovic & Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 256, 311 (Nigel
D. White & Christian Henderson eds., 2012); Schrijver & van den Herik, supra note 2, ¶ 40.
19. See infra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
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from Betazed’s territory are set to continue until the Veridians in Cardassia
are stopped, this may justify Angosia in claiming a right to self-defense in
relation to the manifestation of the Veridian group in the territory of Cardassia.
Notwithstanding, it must be stressed again that invoking self-defense
does not give automatic license to deploy military personnel. Before engaging in a use of force, Angosia would still need to traverse the barriers of
necessity and proportionality. It would not be enough for Angosia simply to
claim that there are elements of the Veridian group in Cardassia linked to
the attacks from wherever they originate. It would need to establish that operations against the Cardassia-based Veridian group are necessary in order
to halt the attacks, and that unilateral forcible measures are the only viable
option. If Cardassia, for example, is ready and able to detain the commanders
of the Veridian group and prevent their activity, then Angosia will have no
cause to engage in forcible action.
As noted earlier, the requirement that must be fulfilled in order to take
action on Cardassia’s territory without its consent is one of the jus ad bellum,
and is separate from the question of whether the members of the Veridian
group are targetable under the jus in bello.20 Being directly responsible for ongoing armed attacks would be the clearest indication for triggering the possibility of a self-defense claim. The other most likely claim by States is one
of anticipatory self-defense. This is not the space to resolve the relentless
debate over anticipatory self-defense.21 If one takes the position that it is
never acceptable, then clearly, this would equally be the case with regard to
armed groups, and not only States. However, if one were to accept that anticipatory self-defense can be supported in certain circumstances,22 then
20. See infra Part III for a discussion on classification and geographical scope.
21. This has been a controversial issue at the heart of self-defense discussions for many
years. See, e.g., D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191–92 (1958); IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275–78 (1963); see
also 2 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS ch. 5,
V (A. C. Campbell trans., Batoche 1901) (1625).
22. There is increasing support for this position in relation to imminent attacks. See
Wilmshurst, supra note 2, at 965; Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of International Law on the
Use of Force by States in Self-Defence (Chatham House Int’l Law Program Working Paper 05/01,
2005), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108106; Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, 660 Parl Deb HL (2004) col. 370 (UK) (“It is therefore the Government’s view that international law permits the use of force in self-defence against an imminent attack but does not authorise the use of force to mount a pre-emptive strike against a
threat that is more remote.”); see also TOM RUYS, ARMED ATTACK AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE
UN CHARTER 324–42 (2010); HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND
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there is a need to clarify how it might operate in the context of transnational
armed groups. The mere presence of members of the Veridian group on
Cardassia’s territory will not suffice. The critical element for a claim to anticipatory self-defense is that an armed attack must be imminent.23 The notion of imminence requires a high degree of certainty that a specific attack
will occur in the foreseeable future, and that the attack cannot be averted by
other means.24 It does not cover general concerns over the capabilities of
certain groups or preventive action to counter vague threats; such formulations stretch the notion of imminence well past the breaking point and leave
it devoid of any meaningful content.25
The analysis thus far has focused on a single armed group with manifestations in more than one State. The next, and seemingly more complex scenario to consider, is a situation in which it is unclear if the armed groups
based in Betazed and Cardassia are simply cells of the same group, or separate entities. In other words, we still have the Veridian group in Betazed, but
the group in Cardassia is now the Yonada group, whose relationship to the
Veridian group is in question. Such a scenario does not have much bearing
on the above analysis with regard to Angosia’s right to use force in Cardassia.
Even if it is determined that the Yonada group and the Veridian group were
one and the same, Angosia would still need to make a separate self-defense
case for use of force in Cardassia. Clearly, therefore, it would also need to
CHANGE, UNITED NATIONS, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY,
REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE, ¶ 188
(2004); U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, ¶ 124, UN Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (“Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent
attack as well as one that has already happened.”). But see the reactions of a significant
number of States who were opposed to a temporal widening of the right to self-defense,
including Pakistan, Mexico and Turkey. RUYS, supra, at 339–41.
23. Imminence has long been recognized as a key component—and form of restriction—for the use of anticipatory self-defense. GROTIUS, supra note 21, ch. 1, V; 1 TRIAL
OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 206–
09 (1947) (addressing the German invasion of Denmark and Norway); HIGH-LEVEL PANEL
ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE, supra note 22, ¶ 188 (“[A] threatened State, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate. The
problem arises where the threat in question is not imminent but still claimed to be real.”).
24. Although a high-degree of certainty cannot be interpreted as absolute certainty. For
an analysis, see Noam Lubell, The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain World, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 697 (Marc Weller ed., 2015).
25. See id.
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do so if the Yonada group were not as obviously connected to the Veridian
group. The legal test was—and remains—whether Angosia can establish that
the armed group in the new State (Cardassia) is behind the armed attacks
against it, and that the use of force in Cardassia is necessary to stop the attacks.
In summary, it is clear that the increasing fragmentation and multi-territorial dimension of operations against armed groups do not alter the basic
tests of the jus ad bellum. Any time a State wishes to use force on the territory
of another State (absent consent or Security Council authorization), it can
only do so if it can make a valid claim of self-defense. While the invocation
of self-defense may be the result of armed attacks by an armed group, its
purpose is to justify the use of force that would otherwise be prohibited
under the UN Charter on the territory of another State. As such, even if the
same armed group has cells in different countries, extending operations to
another State’s territory will require returning to the basic test of self-defense
in relation to that State.
III.

CLASSIFICATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS

Resolving the above debates surrounding the jus ad bellum is but one step
along the long road of legal conundrums requiring attention. Equally controversial are the questions that such multi-territorial fragmented conflicts
pose in the realm of the jus in bello. Once self-defense has been exercised and
hostilities between the State and the armed group ensue, concerns arise over
the categorization of the situation and the ensuing body of rules that applies
to the conduct of the parties. First among these is the need to identify
whether an armed conflict exists and, if so, what type of armed conflict exists. The starting point for this analysis is based upon the following two relatively uncontroversial assumptions. First, hostilities between a State and an
armed group will normally be considered as a non-international armed conflict (NIAC), provided the group has a certain organizational capacity, and
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the violence crosses a certain threshold of intensity.26 Second, hostilities between two States will usually be considered an international armed conflict
(IAC), which does not require the same intensity threshold as a NIAC.27
Much has been said and written about the merits and challenges of classification,28 and elaborate repetition is not required. In brief, whether a situation is or is not an armed conflict, determines the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL). Without the existence of an armed conflict,
IHL simply does not apply and the actual use of force will be regulated solely
in accordance with the law enforcement model found in international human
rights law (IHRL).29 If an armed conflict does exist, then the determination
of whether it is an IAC or NIAC can affect a range of issues, including rules
of detention and which acts might be prosecutable as war crimes before the
International Criminal Court.30
When dealing with multi-territorial fragmented conflicts the nature of
the situation presents two major obstacles to reaching swift agreement on
classification. First, there is the matter of extraterritorial hostilities between
a State and an armed group. Hostilities between a State and an armed group
are considered to be a NIAC, but is this classification affected if the fighting
occurs outside the State’s own borders? Second, if Angosia is engaging in
hostilities against an armed group on the territory of Betazed without the
latter’s consent, is there an IAC between the two States?

26. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995); International Committee of the Red Cross, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined
in International Humanitarian Law? (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross Opinion Paper, 2008),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
27. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995); International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 26.
28. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS (Elizabeth
Wilmshurst ed., 2012); Milanovic & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 18. For an analysis of some
of the challenges arising from the Syrian conflict in this context, see Laurie R. Blank &
Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law, and the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 693 (2013).
29. See infra Part V.
30. Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 28, at 32; Jelena Pejic,
Conflict Classification and the Law Applicable to Detention and the Use of Force, in id at 80.
228

Fragmented Wars

Vol. 93

A. Classification of Hostilities between a State and Extraterritorial Non-State Actors
As previously discussed, armed conflicts between a State and an armed
group are generally considered non-international. The fundamental reasoning behind this separation rests above all on the identity of the parties. The
IAC rules were designed to regulate hostilities between sovereign States,31
whereas the NIAC rules were created for conflicts involving non-State actors.32 The current analysis focuses upon situations that may involve multiple
groups and territories, but nonetheless have States on one side and armed
groups on the other. Accordingly, the starting point for this analysis should
be the presumption of a NIAC rather than an IAC. Notwithstanding, a number of points require closer examination prior to this presumption being
confirmed.
First, there is the matter of whether crossing a border would change the
conflict from a NIAC to an IAC. Let us begin with a relatively simple scenario, sometimes referred to as a spillover conflict—an internal NIAC in
which some of the hostilities “spill over” into a neighboring State (without
that State’s involvement in the conflict).33 The crossing of the border matters
greatly to the jus ad bellum between the two States, but it is submitted here
that it is largely irrelevant to the conflict between the State and the armed
group. The fundamental rules of NIAC must remain applicable.34 As for
31. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA
CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND
SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶ 221 (2d ed. 2016), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY] (“Under Article 2(1), the identity of the actors involved in the hostilities—States—will therefore define
the international character of the armed conflict. In this regard, statehood remains the baseline against which the existence of an armed conflict under Article 2(1) will be measured.”).
32. The NIAC rules are especially important with regard to the status of individuals
and combatant immunity from prosecution.
33. The question of the relationship with the other State will be examined in Part III.B.
34. The ICRC noted that
the relations between parties whose conflict has spilled over remain at a minimum governed
by Common Article 3 and customary IHL. This position is based on the understanding that
the spillover of a NIAC into adjacent territory cannot have the effect of absolving the parties of their IHL obligations simply because an international border has been crossed.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 9–10 (2011),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-internationalconference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf [hereinafter IHL
CHALLENGES].
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shifting between NIAC and IAC, imagine a straightforward spillover conflict
occurring in a desert area where there is not even a fence to mark the border.
There is simply no sense in constantly switching the conflict between being
international and non-international every time the armed group steps across
the border. This is always the same conflict, a NIAC between the State and
an armed group. In other words, the crossing of a border is not in and of
itself enough to transform a NIAC into an IAC.35
Let us now expand the scenario to additional territories. Angosia is engaged in a major NIAC and, as in the earlier example, most of the fighting
is still within Angosia. However, it is now occasionally spilling over into three
neighboring territories: Betazed in the north, Cardassia in the east, and the
State of Davlos in the south. So long as the fighting is still between Angosia
and the same single armed group there is no reason to see this as different
from the previous example, meaning that we are still dealing with a NIAC
between the State and the group. The involvement of multiple territories
does not per se transform the conflict from a NIAC to an IAC.
Thus far, the examples have presented a conflict that had an internal
NIAC at its core. Let us now shift the center of gravity so that the armed
group is based primarily in Betazed and is carrying out attacks against Angosia by launching missiles and occasional raids across the border. Again, for
now, we are setting aside the question of the relationship between Angosia
and Betazed, but for the sake of clarity, we should assume that the armed
group’s actions cannot be attributed to the host State.36 As in the first example, we would not shift the classification between an IAC and a NIAC when
they fire a missile from the desert area a few meters across the border or
whenever they venture to Angosia’s side of the desert. This is still at its essence an armed conflict between a State and a non-State actor, and accordingly, is a NIAC.
Going one step further, let us relocate the armed group so that they are
not across an immediate border, but are in the State of Ekos, two hundred
miles away, firing missiles into Angosia (over Cardassia that sits between
Angosia and Ekos). They also continue to conduct occasional attacks by
clandestine cells operating inside Angosia, but the group is largely based in
Ekos, which has no adjacent border. A question arises as to whether one

35. At this stage, it should be recalled that the current question is only about the conflict
between the State and the armed group; the issue of the relationship between the two States
will be examined in Part III.B.
36. See supra Part II and especially infra Part III.B.
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should differentiate between conflicts that involve the armed group operating across an adjacent border, and conflicts in which the armed group is
located further afield.37 But, if a NIAC can be found when operating across
an adjacent border, why would adding distance change the classification? It
is accepted that one State assisting another State in its internal NIAC could
also be party to a NIAC,38 thus allowing conceptually for the idea of engaging
the rules of NIAC for hostilities against an armed group primarily (or even
completely) taking place in distant territory. The difference in our example
is that the territorial State has not issued an invitation and might not be involved at all in the hostilities. The relationship and legal ramifications between the States is a separate question (which will be examined next), but
has nothing to do with the precise distance between them and whether or
not they share a border. Likewise, the question would equally arise in the
case of adjacent States. Accordingly, here too it seems that the new factor—
distance—should not in and of itself transform a NIAC into an IAC.
To summarize, hostilities between a non-State actor and a State are, in
principle, meant to be viewed through the prism of NIAC.39 They are not an
international conflict as they are not between two (or more) States. Elements
of cross-border operations, multiple territories or large distances do not
themselves change this classification. Rather, the identity of the parties determines the classification of conflict. The remaining question is whether
actions by Angosia against the armed group in the territory of Betazed without the latter’s consent necessarily brings about an IAC between the two
States.
B. Classifying the Situation between the Two States
As discussed above, there are contentious issues in relation to the jus ad bellum
and the exercise of self-defense against armed groups in the territory of other
States. Even once these are resolved, there remain other legal complexities
with regard to the relationship between the States. Let us return to the initial
scenario in which Angosia has claimed the right to self-defense and is using
37. This question is of particular relevance when it comes to the geographical scope of
IHL in the context of drone strikes. For a reasoned approach differentiating between the
situations, see Jelena Pejic, Extraterritorial Targeting by Means of Armed Drones: Some Legal Implications, 96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 67, 80, 102–03 (2014).
38. Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 581, 605 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013).
39. Provided that the NIAC threshold is met.
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force against an armed group in the territory of Betazed without Betazed’s
consent, and the actions of the armed group are not attributable to Betazed.
In accordance with the earlier analysis, we shall also assume that if the NIAC
requirements of intensity and organization are met, the violence between
Angosia and the armed group would be a NIAC, even if an extraterritorial
one. The following analysis focuses on the remaining key question concerning the two States, namely whether the use of force by one State on the
territory of another without its consent means that an IAC exists between
them.
The contention requiring clarification is whether any force without consent by one State on the territory of another must automatically be classified
as an IAC between the two States. There is no reason to dispute that in some
circumstances there could be an IAC. For example, if the force employed
includes the “deployment of military means in order to overcome the enemy
or force it into submission, to eradicate the threat it represents or to force it
to change its course of action”40 (in which the “enemy” is the other State),
there would be an IAC. The difficulty, however, is with the contention that
“an international armed conflict arises between the territorial State and the
intervening State when force is used on the former’s territory without its
consent.”41 The debate, therefore, is not between those who say “yes” there
is an IAC and those who say “never.” Rather, it is between those who favor
a position that non-consensual force against a non-State actor on the territory of another State is always an IAC, as opposed to those who say it is only
sometimes an IAC, depending on the circumstances.42 The following analysis
supports the latter view.
40. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 31, ¶ 225.
41. Id., ¶ 262.
42. For the varying views, see Terry D. Gill, Classifying the Conflict in Syria, 92 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 353 (2016); Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note
28, at 32, 70–79. See also the debates on the Just Security website, especially Kenneth Watkin,
The ICRC Updated Commentaries: Reconciling Form and Substance, Part I, JUST SECURITY (Aug.
24, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/32538/icrc-updated-commentaries-reconcilingform-substance/ [hereinafter Watkin Part I]; Kenneth Watkin, The ICRC Updated Commentaries: Reconciling Form and Substance, Part II, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/32608/icrc-updated-commentaries-reconciling-form-substance-part-ii/ [hereinafter Watkin Part II]; Sean Watts, The Updated First Geneva Convention
Commentary, DOD’s Law of War Manual, and a More Perfect Law of War, Part I, JUST SECURITY
(July 5, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/31749/updated-geneva-convention-commentary-dods-lowm-perfect-law-war/; Adil Haque, Whose Armed Conflict? Which Law of Armed
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That in some circumstances a use of force against a non-State actor on
the territory of another State without its consent could create an IAC should
be uncontroversial.43 If, for example, an armed group is located in an urban
area and the hostilities lead to massive destruction of civilian objects and the
death of civilians, or if the operations against the group involved destruction
of State facilities, such as major roads or airfields, there would be wide agreement that an IAC has come into existence (between the two States, possibly
alongside the NIAC between the State and the armed group). Likewise, if in
the course of its actions against the armed group Angosia wound up occupying any of Betazed’s territory, this would undoubtedly trigger the Fourth
Geneva Convention44 and the ensuing rules of IAC. Israel’s operations
against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 will—certainly at the later stages of
the conflict—have triggered the rules of IAC for a number of the above
reasons.45 Tellingly, the cases that often come up are those of Ugandan operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Israeli operations in
Lebanon.46 However, these cases are indicative of ones in which there would
have been wider agreement of an IAC (for at least part of the operations)
due to the nature of the activities and the amount of harm caused.47 Consequently, by focusing on the higher end of hostilities not enough attention is
paid to the repercussions of such an approach in situations involving more
limited force.
Force used against a non-State actor on the territory of another State is
not confined to bombardments and incursions by large numbers of soldiers.
Israel’s abduction of Adolph Eichmann from Argentina was a forcible act
carried out on the territory of another State without its consent,48 yet it does
Conflict?, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/33362/armed-conflict-law-armed-conflict/.
43. Even those who do not take the automatic trigger approach will readily accept that
certain factual circumstances would create an international armed conflict. See Gill, supra
note 42.
44. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
45. For a classification analysis of this conflict, see Iain Scobbie, Lebanon 2006, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 28, at 387.
46. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 31, ¶ 261 n.101; Milanovic & Hadzi-Vidanovic,
supra 18, at 296.
47. Gill, supra note 42, at 372.
48. Argentina specifically noted that “he was removed to Israel by force” in a manner
that violated Argentinian sovereignty. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th mtg. at 5 (June 22,
1960). The Security Council declared that “acts such as that under consideration, which
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not stand to reason that this created an IAC between Israel and Argentina.
And, while some may object to this example as being too low a level of force
and not a military action, such objections would—as will be seen below—
contradict other aspects of the trigger for IAC.49 Moreover, one can find
alternative examples that slowly move up the scales of violence that would
still seem incongruous with the notion of IAC. The sinking of the Rainbow
Warrior is one such case. Here, French military agents carried out an operation in New Zealand’s territory, which included the use of explosives and led
to serious damage of property and death.50 Here too, would one take the
position that there was an IAC between France and New Zealand? Such
claims would not receive serious consideration.
A major impetus for the “automatic IAC” approach is to ensure that the
rules of IHL are there to provide protection and appropriate regulation of
conduct. At the higher end of situations under discussion (such as IsraelLebanon 2006), these are usually cases in which there is likely to be agreement that some form of armed conflict exists and the debate is focused upon
distinguishing between NIAC, IAC, or a combination of NIAC and IAC.
However, a critical weakness in the “automatic IAC” approach is that it risks
creating an IAC in situations which manifestly should not be regarded as an
armed conflict and in which no IHL rules (neither of IAC nor NIAC) should
be applied. Introducing IHL in such situations does the exact opposite of
the stated aim, by reducing protection and providing inappropriate rules of
conduct. A law enforcement approach as found in IHRL and domestic criminal law would be far better suited for regulating incidents such as the Eichmann case or the Rainbow Warrior affair.
Accepting that there may be some circumstances in which non-consensual force by Angosia against a non-State actor in Betazed does not trigger
an IAC negates the possibility of arguing for an automatic approach to determining an IAC. If the answer is “sometimes” an IAC rather than “always,”
it requires us to examine the issue further to elucidate the criteria at the heart
of any such determination. A number of possible criteria must be considered. These criteria can be grouped together in two primary categories: the
nature of the force itself, including the level and type of force used, and the
actual effects of the force on the ground. The second category centers upon
affect the sovereignty of a Member State and therefore cause international friction, may, if
repeated, endanger international peace and security.” S.C. Res. 138, ¶ 1 (June 23, 1960).
49. See infra notes 53–54.
50. For a description and legal analysis, see Michael Pugh, Legal Aspects of the Rainbow
Warrior Affair, 36 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 655 (1987).
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the intention of Angosia, the targets of the operations, and the existence of
animus belligerandi between the States as reflected in their own views.
The nature of the force used serves as a helpful starting point. Returning
to the example of the Eichmann abduction, one might argue that this incident should be excluded from this analysis, as it was clearly not an act of
hostilities, involved relatively little force, affected only a single individual and
was not of a military nature. However, none of these issues on their own
would be enough to exclude the possibility of an IAC. The detention of a
single soldier could trigger the rules of IAC,51 in which case the fact that this
situation revolved around the forcible abduction of just one individual could
not be a definitive excluding criterion. Likewise, it is accepted that acts triggering an IAC do not necessarily have to be conducted by military forces,52
thus the fact that intelligence agents seized Eichmann does not alone exclude
the possibility of classifying the action as an armed conflict. Neither can the
Rainbow Warrior incident be excluded from the analysis on these grounds.
The second aspect that must be considered relates to the intentions of
Angosia and the views of both Angosia and Betazed as to the situation between them. While it is widely accepted that the determination of the existence of armed conflict must not be dictated solely by the views of the parties
to prevent self-interested denial of applicable rules,53 this should not mean
that their intentions or views are wholly irrelevant. It is also posited, for example, that mistakes in the use of force (e.g., an accidental release of a munition while overflying another country) are not acts of armed conflict54 and
that belligerent intent requires a factual assessment as to whether “a State is

51. “Even if there has been no fighting, the fact that persons covered by the Convention are detained is sufficient for its application. The number of persons captured in such
circumstances is, of course, immaterial.” COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 23 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960).
52. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 31, ¶ 226.
53. Id., ¶ 213.
54. Id., ¶ 241.
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effectively involved in military operations or other hostile action against another State.”55 In addition, there is a question as to the existence of animus
belligerandi between the two States.56
In the current context, it is submitted that if Angosia limits its operations
solely against the non-State actor and has no intention of engaging in an IAC
with Betazed, and if Betazed does not see Angosia’s actions as having created
an armed conflict between them, then this must be taken into account when
determining the legal classification of the situation.57 The 1952 Commentary
on Geneva Convention I spoke of a “difference arising between two States and
leading to the intervention of armed forces.”58 The new Commentary correctly
asserts that this should not be interpreted to exclude one-sided hostilities, so
that conflict between two States can occur even if Betazed has not responded
to the attacks by Angosia.59 However, it is submitted that the notion of “between” still carries weight, as it can be understood as pointing to the combination of the objective and subjective aspects of belligerent intent and animus
belligerandi. It is stressed that this position does not claim that intention and
State views would negate all other facts on the ground. As noted earlier,
States must not be allowed to deny applicability of rules out of self-interest.
Nonetheless, their intention and views should be one factor among several

55. “This involvement is aimed at neutralizing enemy military personnel and assets,
hampering its military operations, or using/controlling its territory, be it to subdue or defeat
the adversary, to induce it to change its behaviour, or to gain a military advantage. Belligerent
intent must therefore be deduced from the facts.” INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 8 n.3 (2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts.
56. “[A]nimus belligerandi is a pre-requisite for a State of war to exist—denoting the
purely subjective dimension of the notion of war.” Id. at 8 n.3.
57. States do on occasion make their opinion public on such matters. For example,
note Canada’s position that “Canada’s military actions against ISIL in Syria are aimed at
further degrading ISIL’s ability to carry out attacks. These military actions are not aimed at
Syria or the Syrian people, nor do they entail support for the Syrian regime.” Canada Letter,
supra note 6; see also Australia Letter, supra note 6. Gill cites as examples some of the U.S.
drone strikes, Turkish operations against the PKK in Iraq, Kenyan armed forces in Somalia,
and Colombia’s incursions against the FARC in Ecuador, noting that “[i]n none of these
did any of the States concerned ever consider themselves in a situation of armed conflict
with each other.” Gill, supra note 42, at 371.
58. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (Jean
Pictet ed., 1952) (emphasis added).
59. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 31, ¶¶ 222–23.
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factors that can be taken into account, along with additional considerations
and factual circumstances.
One of the difficulties in the debate stems from the conflation of issues
from the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. Attacks on the territory of another
State comprised of limited operations that affect nothing but an armed group
would certainly require further attention under the jus ad bellum as to possible
violations of territorial sovereignty and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. But
not every operation on the territory should be considered a military operation
against the territory in the jus in bello sense. Rather than speaking of attacks
against the territory and without consent,60 such limited operations are better
described as operations on the territory without consent. This would more
appropriately reflect that these are jus ad bellum concerns.61 There would then
remain a separate question as to the nature of the operations and whether or
not they trigger an IAC. Consent will usually be determinative for resolving
jus ad bellum issues, but for IHL classification purposes, rather than being
determinative, its relevance should be considered in light of a range of factors to be evaluated.
For example, consider a scenario in which a group of criminals robbed
an Angosian bank near the border area, took hostages with them to avoid
being shot by the police and ended up in an old shack a hundred yards over
the border in an unpopulated desert area of Betazed. Although Betazed has
no control over these criminals and displays no desire to act themselves to
free the hostages, it refuses to allow Angosia to mount a rescue operation.
Angosia nonetheless sends a small Special Forces unit across the border into
the desert and rescues the hostages while engaging in gunfire with the criminal gang, with no harm or damage to anyone else.62 In these circumstances,
Betazed may well complain about a violation of its sovereignty,63 but if neither of the States consider themselves in the midst of an IAC, it is unlikely
to be considered as such.

60. Id., ¶¶ 224, 260.
61. For a discussion on sovereignty and consent in this context, see Watkin Part II,
supra note 42.
62. On the separate issue of the related jus ad bellum rules, such scenarios are addressed
in the debates over rescue of nationals abroad. Tom Ruys, The “Protection of Nationals” Doctrine
Revisited, 13 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 233 (2008); Committee on The Use
of Force, supra note 5.
63. Watkin notes the case of the French attempt to rescue an individual held by alShabaab in Somalia following which Somalia complained about the violation of its sovereignty. Watkin Part II, supra note 42.
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A primary concern for those who take the approach that it is virtually
always an IAC is to ensure that appropriate rules are applicable to the situation at hand.64 Indeed, it is accepted here that under many circumstances in
which the population or State are affected it would be appropriate to apply
the rules of IAC. However, as outlined above, automatically applying the IAC
framework when the force is strictly limited in both intention and effects to
a non-State actor can equally result in inappropriate rules and in less protection. This is especially the case in situations that should not be considered as
an armed conflict at all (neither NIAC nor IAC), but instead, should be regulated by human rights law and domestic criminal law. In these situations,
an IHL framework is not appropriate, as it allows for greater collateral harm
and other unwanted repercussions. Accordingly, it is submitted that a nuanced approach that does not generate an automatic IAC would result in
legal frameworks that are more appropriate for the different situations that
could arise.
IV.

THE SCOPE OF CONFLICT

The analysis thus far of the classification under the jus in bello has focused on
the question of a single group operating from the territory of one other State.
As with the jus ad bellum, here too this analysis must expand to encompass
situations involving the territories of multiple States and more than one
armed group. As will be seen, two matters are of critical importance. First,
whether the armed groups in the different States are all, in fact, different
branches of a single entity (or partners to the same conflict), and second, the
separate but related question as to what type of situations in the different
locations would lead to the applicability of IHL (the debate over the “geographical scope”).
A. Armed Groups and Associated Forces
The current analysis returns to the starting point in which it has already been
determined that an armed conflict exists between Angosia and the Veridian
group in Betazed. Furthermore, the underlying assumption as asserted earlier
is that this is an extraterritorial NIAC. The question now expands to include
the Yonada group in Cardassia, against whom Angosia is also intending to
take forcible action. As in the earlier case, here too there is a separate matter
64. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 31, ¶ 262.
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of the relationship between Angosia and Cardassia. There will be a need for
a jus ad bellum analysis with regard to Angosia’s claim to be able to use force
on Cardassia’s territory if the latter does not consent. Equally, there will be
a need to assess whether the specific action taken could trigger a separate
IAC between the two States.65 Indeed, it is entirely possible that there would
be separate IACs between Angosia and Betazed, and Angosia and Cardassia,
just one IAC or no IAC. These inter-State issues aside, the framework governing the force used by Angosia against the Yonada group requires elucidation, and the connection between the Veridian group and the Yonada group
may have significant bearing on the final determination.
If it is clear that the Veridians and Yonadas are one and the same and
they are operating within a single command and control structure in jointly
carrying out the group’s military operations, then Angosia will likely claim
that military action occurring between it and the Yonada group would effectively be part of the pre-existing NIAC against the Veridians.66 In principle,
a single group may operate across borders, as has been the case with Hezbollah, the Lord’s Resistance Army, Boko Haram and others. However, the
experience of recent years with regard to Al-Qaida and the Islamic State
demonstrates that it is often far from straightforward to claim that groups in
different locations are part of a single entity, even if they might use the same
name.67
In the absence of evidence that these groups are related parts operating
together under a single command and control structure, there is a need to
examine whether other situations could lead to a determination that they are
to be viewed together in the context of classifying parties to an armed conflict. One other possibility might be if, although separate groups, one group
was in control of the other. Control of a group by a State has been presented
as key to conflict classification.68 While there is not—as of now—the same
65. See supra Part III.B.
66. There remains the issue of the geographical scope of IHL, which will be examined
in Part IV.B.
67. Noam Lubell, The War (?) against Al-Qaeda, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 28, at 421.
68. The correct test for determining the required nature of control (and whether there
should be separate tests for the specific contexts of classification and attribution) has been
the subject of debate. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries arts. 4–11, in International Law Commission, Report
on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 43 (2001), reprinted in [2001]
2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2); id. ¶¶ 80–122; Nicaragua, supra note 7, ¶¶ 93–116;
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level of detailed analysis and rules regarding the notion of international responsibility for armed groups, it would not seem farfetched to propose that
for the purpose of conflict classification, control by one armed group of
another armed group would operate in an analogous manner. In other
words, in our scenario, if it emerges that the Yonada group is operating under the control of the Veridian group (or vice versa), then the two groups
could be viewed as both being party to the same armed conflict.
Matters become further complicated if the two groups are not operating
within a unified command and control structure, or with one group controlling the other. In such cases, there can be no swift determination that the
operations against them would be part of the same conflict. It then becomes
necessary to determine the precise nature of the connection between the
Veridians and Yonadas and whether there is a particular type of link that
would entail a conclusion that they are party to the same conflict. Recent
writings and government positions have referred to notions such as “associated forces” and “co-belligerents” when discussing such situations. In the
latest of attempts to set the parameters for these terms, the United States has
stated the following:
To be considered an “associated force” of al-Qa’ida or the Taliban for purposes of the authority conferred by the 2001 AUMF, an entity must satisfy
two conditions. First, the entity must be an organized, armed group that
has entered the fight alongside al-Qa’ida or the Taliban. Second, the group
must be a co-belligerent with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners. Thus, a group is not an associated force simply because it aligns with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban or embraces their ideology. Merely engaging in acts of terror or merely sympathizing with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban is not enough to bring a group within
the scope of the 2001 AUMF. Rather, a group must also have entered alQa’ida or the Taliban’s fight against the United States or its coalition partners”69

Neither “associated forces” nor “co-belligerents” provide an obvious
ready-made solution, as they do not rest on clearly defined and agreed upon
terms of international law. The reliance on these terms has been criticized
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 146–62 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶¶ 379–415 (Feb. 26).
69. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 15, at 4–5.
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for a range of reasons.70 Whether using the phrase associated forces or the
term co-belligerents, the key question is what are the underlying criteria for
making such a determination and whether these criteria are appropriate to
the context at hand. Absent clarity on how these determinations are reached,
there is a real risk of using a subjective and loose definition that can too easily
be manipulated.71 Use of the term co-belligerents raises a particular concern
as it involves using a concept that presents itself as a legal term of art and an
acceptable categorization, while ignoring the fact that it is taken out of its
inter-State context and potentially misapplied to relationships between
armed groups. This is particularly true when viewed in the historical context
of neutrality laws.72
Even beyond the specifics of neutrality, there is a fundamental difference
between IACs and NIACs, which presents a problem for transposition of
co-belligerency notions from the former to the latter. For the purposes of
an IAC, a declaration of war may suffice to trigger an armed conflict.73 Accordingly, if there is an IAC between the State of Kronos and the State of
Ledos, and the State of Pentarus declares that it is joining Ledos in the fight
against Kronos, one might say that this leads to Pentarus and Ledos as cobelligerents and to view them as both being party to the same IAC against
Kronos. Caution must however be exercised before drawing the analogy to
the case of armed groups. For an armed conflict with a non-State actor, a
certain threshold of intensity is required.74 Declarations are not a sufficient
trigger. Accordingly, if the Yonada group declares that it is joining the Veridian group in its war against Angosia, one cannot deduce that this alone is
enough to consider them as co-belligerents and that the Yonada group is
now automatically in an armed conflict against Angosia. Such a determination will require more than words.75 Moreover, even if it is action that we are
measuring, it will not be enough simply to show that the Yonada group has
also engaged in violent activities against Angosia. Both groups might be

70. For a recent in-depth analysis, see Rebecca Ingber, Co-Belligerency, 42 YALE JOURNAL
67 (2017) (forthcoming).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 88–93; see also Nathan Derejko, Understanding the Contours of Non-International Armed Conflict 118–23 (Dec. 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Essex) (on file with author).
73. See GC IV, supra note 44, art. 2. Common Article 2 appears in all four 1949 Geneva
Conventions.
74. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
75. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 15, at 4–5.
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fighting the same State without being associated with each other (the multitude of armed groups operating against the Syrian regime provides ample
evidence that sharing an enemy does not make one friends).76 It is submitted
that there is a need for a particular type of cooperation to enable a determination that the armed groups are, in fact, co-belligerents. The clearest case
would be in a situation in which each group, independently, is engaged in
action against the State which satisfies the NIAC criteria, but despite being
separate groups, they are coordinating their operations against the State (e.g.,
by dividing up zones of activity or by coordinating the time and place of
attacks in order to maximize their effect).
It is generally accepted that the determination of a NIAC rests on two
key components: the organizational structure of the armed group, and the
intensity of hostilities.77 Nonetheless, there is sound reason for accepting that
it may not be appropriate to use this same test for determining the entry of
a new party into a pre-existing NIAC, since the overall level of prevailing
violence has already surpassed the required threshold.78 The underlying test
of organization and intensity will remain valid, but its assessment will need
to take into account the pre-existing conflict. The organizational requirement should remain in place and the new group cannot be considered a party
to the conflict without it. As for the intensity threshold, rather than measuring the intensity from the time of its entry, it would need to be shown that
the new group is now collectively engaging in the prevailing hostilities alongside an existing party. The threshold for joining could, therefore, be lower
than in the test for determining the start of a new conflict, as it would presumably not require an element of being protracted, and may even be satisfied with relatively fewer acts than would have been required had there not
been a pre-existing conflict.
The precise actions that would satisfy the threshold in this context require further elaboration. Direct engagement in battlefield hostilities (such
76. For the complexities of classifying the Syrian conflict, see Gill, supra note 42.
77. There is some debate on how to interpret the notion of “protracted,” as discussed
initially in Tadić and revisited in Haradinaj, including whether “protracted” would always
require a lengthy time period (which could be problematic if extremely high levels of violence break out early on), or whether it should be read as indicative of intensity, with the
latter being the key criterion. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶
49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008); see also Marco Sassóli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law 6–7 (HPCR Occasional Paper Series,
2006), http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper6
.pdf.
78. Ingber, supra note 70, at 97; Derejko, supra note 72, at 125.
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as use of weapons during attacks) would be relatively straightforward in this
regard, but one might also advance the proposition that the provision of
material support for the commission of hostilities could lead to a determination that the new group has become a party to the conflict, as has been proposed in the context of a State joining other State(s) in a pre-existing NIAC.79
Such a support test for armed groups cannot be satisfied by declarations of
a common cause or pledges of allegiance.80 The support-based approach, if
adopted, must be carefully advanced in a manner that avoids unwarranted
expansion of the web of conflict and should be limited to support that directly affects the conduct of hostilities, rather than indirect support such as
the provision of supplies or financial backing.81 It may be, however, wiser to
avoid advancing this approach in the context of armed groups unless they
are actually participating in the hostilities.82
Lastly, in situations in which the new group has not become a party to
the conflict, there is a separate matter of whether individuals might take a
direct part in hostilities. In our example, the Yonada group might not become a party to the conflict, but individual Yonadas might engage in hostilities within the Angosia-Veridian conflict.83
In summary, the notions of associated forces and co-belligerents have
penetrated the legal discourse surrounding military operations against armed
groups, although both lack definitional clarity. Further, both terms at times
rely on an erroneous analogy between IAC and NIAC. While there may be
a case for using a lower threshold when determining whether a second organized armed group has become party to a prevailing conflict, such approaches must be interpreted narrowly to avoid widening the scope of the
conflict in an inappropriate fashion.
79. In the determination of when multinational forces might become a party to a preexisting NIAC, Ferraro proposes the following criteria: (1) there is a pre-existing NIAC in
the territory where multinational forces intervene; (2) actions related to the conduct of
hostilities are undertaken by multinational forces in the context of that pre-existing conﬂict;
(3) the multinational forces’ military operations are carried out in support of a party to that
pre-existing conﬂict; (4) the action in question is undertaken pursuant to an ofﬁcial decision
by the troop-contributing countries or international organization in question to support a
party involved in that pre-existing conﬂict. Tristan Ferraro, The Applicability and Application
of International Humanitarian Law to Multinational Forces, 95 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE
RED CROSS 561, 584 (2013).
80. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 15.
81. Ferraro, supra note 79, at 585.
82. Albeit with a lower threshold for joining, as presented in the preceding paragraph.
83. Subject to debates over the interpretation of direct participation in hostilities. See
infra note 93.
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B. The Geographical Scope
Even in situations in which the non-State actor in Cardassia is recognized as
being part of the Veridians from Betazed, there remains the controversial
issue of the geographical scope of the battlefield. There exists no clear legal
delineation of the battlefield, and there is significant inconsistency in the
writings and case law on the matter.84 The crucial issue for the purposes of
governing military operations and uses of force should not be artificial attempts to draw a neat line around a specific area, but rather to determine
when and where specific rules of IHL might apply. Indeed, it is impossible
to have one predetermined area for all IHL rules, since some of them are
context dependent and apply only to particular situations regardless of territory. One such example is the rules relating to the handling of prisoners during an armed conflict, whether in the territory of the parties or even in neutral territory.85 IHL was not designed to and does not attempt to determine
the geographical boundaries of conflict.86 Quite the opposite, IHL was designed to apply to actions taken as part of an armed conflict, wherever they
may occur.
In the situation currently under examination, the question is whether the
dislocation between the manifestation of the non-State actor in Betazed and
the non-State actor in Cardassia (assuming they are elements of the same
party), affects the applicability of IHL to the operations Angosia is taking in
Cardassia. If Angosia and the armed group manifestation in Cardassia are
engaged in two-way, high-intensity hostilities, for example heavy weapons
and missile fire from both sides, there should be little objection to viewing
this as simply one more location in which the pre-existing NIAC is occurring. The rules of IHL would clearly be applicable to this situation. Where
matters become more debatable is in situations in which there is a relatively
limited use of force against a small group or even an individual in the territory of Cardassia. U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia are the

84. For an examination of these cases, see Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, The Global
Battlefield: Drones and the Geographical Extension of Armed Conflict, 11 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 65 (2013).
85. GC IV, supra note 44, art. 4(B)(2).
86. Lubell & Derejko, supra note 84; see also Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflict, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1 (2014).
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obvious examples of such situations and have been at the heart of the relevant debates.87
It has been argued that some operations of this type risk extending the
battlefield beyond acceptable parameters, and in certain circumstances
should not be governed by IHL.88 The repercussions of such an approach
are of huge importance since without the laws of armed conflict it would be
more difficult (although not entirely impossible) to legitimize direct recourse
to lethal force against individuals.89 Three primary legal frameworks are of
particular relevance: the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello, and IHRL. As presented
earlier, the jus ad bellum will determine the legality of the resort to force by
Angosia on the territory of Cardassia, and whether or not Angosia has violated international law in this inter-State relationship. It is not intended to
regulate the manner in which force is used and contains no rules on matters
such as status of individuals or weapon use. The classification of the situation
under IHL is explicitly meant to exclude reliance on the determination of jus
ad bellum legality. Whether or not a particular situation should be categorized
as an armed conflict and, if so, of what type, does not depend on whether
prior actions were in violation or in accordance with the jus ad bellum. While
it will determine the inter-State legal aspects of resorting to force on the
territory of Cardassia, it is not part of the assessment as to whether and
which rules of IHL apply to the actual way in which the force is used. Nonetheless, the jus ad bellum does play a critical role in preventing the spread of
conflict. As noted earlier, Angosia cannot expand its operations against the
Veridian group into Cardassia without meeting the stringent requirements of
self-defense, including the need to thwart a specific armed attack and the
absence of alternative options presenting a necessity to do so by force.
The applicability of IHL in these circumstances will rest upon the nature
of the operations and the identity of the parties concerned, rather than their
location. Geography alone cannot be the primary criterion for the applicability of IHL. Crossing borders is a matter for the jus ad bellum, not for the
applicability of IHL. As presented earlier, if a party to a conflict has a military
camp straddling two sides of the border, or an armed group operates from

87. Precise information on the number of strikes and their effects remains contested,
but not the fact that such strikes do take place. See, e.g., Jack Serle & Jessica Purkiss, Drone
Wars: The Full Data, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (JAN. 1, 2017),
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-01/drone-wars-the-full-data.
88. IHL CHALLENGES, supra note 34, at 22.
89. See infra Part V.
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a desert area in which it is not clear when the border has been crossed, moving a hundred yards to one side or the other of the border will not change
the applicability of IHL. Similarly, it cannot be purely a question of distance
from the more central fighting zone. It is quite possible that a small group
of commanders camped far from the central battlefield remain part of the
conflict, just as the generals conducting the war fall within the rules of IHL
even if their military base is across the ocean.
Whether or not individuals are legitimate targets of attack under the rules
of IHL will depend on the belligerent nexus, measured through a combination of factors that can include their connection to a party to the conflict,
their individual status, and the activities in which they are engaged.90 Their
actions, not only their status, must be part of the analysis in order to avoid
creating a situation in which individuals can never disassociate themselves
from the conflict. For NIACs, in which there is no clearly agreed upon equivalent to combatant status and where the controversies over notions of direct
participation in hostilities are particularly apt,91 the activities in which they
are engaged will be doubly crucial to this determination.
When U.S. military personnel seated in Nevada operate a drone on a
combat mission in Afghanistan, they are legitimate targets for attack despite
being far from the battlefield, as would still be the case if they were operating
the drones from a third State or a ship on the high seas. If Taliban fighters
infiltrate the United States to attack these drone operators, they would
equally be subject to the targeting rules of IHL while on U.S. soil. However,
and the applicability of IHL notwithstanding, in situations geographically far
removed from the central zones of fighting, IHRL may play a vital role.

90. Lubell & Derejko, supra note 84, at 84–86.
91. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE]; Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive
Guidance, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
641(2010); Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive
Elements, id. at 697; Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, id. at 741; W. Hayes Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, id. at 769; Nils Melzer, Keeping the
Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, id. at 831.
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V. THE INTERPLAY WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
International human rights law remains applicable at all times, including during armed conflict. Nonetheless, it does not itself contain rules on categorizing situations as armed conflict or not. The classification is solely a matter of
IHL. The relevance of human rights law is not in determining the applicability of IHL, but in the interplay between the two bodies of law in situations
to which they both apply. Forcible operations by Angosia against members
of an armed group will not be exempt from IHRL. The extraterritorial applicability of human rights obligations is another debated and divisive topic.
In that regard, it is submitted that there is ample evidence through extensive
legal analysis and the case law of human rights bodies pointing to the inevitability of accepting that when a State, through its agents, uses lethal force
against an individual, it thereby exercises control over the individual’s life
and is accordingly bound by IHRL’s right to life provisions.92
If this is occurring in the context of an armed conflict, the precise contours of the obligation and any subsequent determination of whether they
have been adhered to will likely be affected by two factors. First, the factual
circumstances of an armed conflict will affect the measures that can be undertaken by a State in light of the prevailing circumstances. For example, the
European Court of Human Rights has accepted that a State cannot be expected to conduct the same type of investigation into alleged violations in an
area of armed conflict as it might in the peaceful confines of its own territory.93 Second, the armed conflict will have triggered the applicability of IHL
and the interplay between IHL and IHRL will need to be taken into account.94
92. For a detailed analysis of cases, see LUBELL, supra note 2, ch. 8; see also DARAGH
MURRAY ET AL., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT
ch. 3 (2017).
93. Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, ¶ 168 (2011) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105606.
The Court takes as its starting point the practical problems caused to the investigatory authorities by the fact that the United Kingdom was an Occupying Power in a foreign and
hostile region in the immediate aftermath of invasion and war. These practical problems
included the breakdown in the civil infrastructure, leading inter alia to shortages of local
pathologists and facilities for autopsies; the scope for linguistic and cultural misunderstandings between the occupiers and the local population; and the danger inherent in any activity
in Iraq at that time. As Stated above, the Court considers that in circumstances such as
these the procedural duty under Article 2 must be applied realistically, to take account of
specific problems faced by investigators.

94. Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by Professor Francoise Hampson & Professor
Noam Lubell of The Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, Georgia v. Russia (II),
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While many situations will place IHL at the foreground, most notably in
battlefield operations between opposing soldiers, there may also be cases
whereby the nature of the operation and the situational circumstances require that the starting point for use of force is the IHRL framework.95 For
example, a routine military patrol in an occupied territory with no ongoing
hostilities might be expected to operate within a law enforcement approach
concerning the use of force insofar as the civilian population is concerned.96
It is submitted here that distance from the battlefield and the lack of active
hostilities at a given moment will be important factors in the interplay between IHL and IHRL, and in certain situations may require that the latter
take predominance. Rather than predicate the dominant legal framework for
governing the manner of force upon arbitrary State borders, the proximity
to active hostilities and control over the area would serve as more appropriate yardsticks.97 This should be equally true for operations occurring within
a State’s territory or extraterritorially. In the earlier example of the Taliban
fighter who has come to the United States to attack drone operators, it was
noted that IHL is applicable as this involves a member of a party to a conflict
planning to engage in an act of hostilities. However, it is also the case that
IHRL will apply. Consequently, if the United States has the ability to peacefully detain the individual while walking down a street in Las Vegas, then,
despite the fact that IHL may permit targeting, the interplay with IHRL may
App. No. 38263/08 (ECtHR), http://repository.essex.ac.uk/9689/1/hampson-lubellgeorgia-russia-amicus-01062014.pdf (last visited May 23, 2017).
95. MURRAY ET AL., supra note 92, ch. 4.
96. “The experts agreed that law enforcement’s stricter standards were better suited to
regulating all use of force in relation to the policing activities conducted by the occupying
power.” TRISTAN FERRARO, OCCUPATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ADMINISTRATION OF
FOREIGN TERRITORY 113 (2012).
97. For further development of this approach, see Noam Lubell & Daragh Murray,
Operationalizing the Interplay between LOAC and IHL: A Way Forward (forthcoming) (on file
with author). Although stated as policy rather than law, as evidence of the practicability of
such an approach it is notable that the U.S. Presidential Policy Guidance for Approving
Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of
Active Hostilities
lays out procedures to determine whether the overseas target is lawful and then whether, as
a matter of policy, the lawful target should be attacked. It lays out a policy preference to
capture if feasible, rather than use lethal force, as well as prescribed procedures for highlevel approval of such operations.

Jennifer M. O’Connor, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Address at New York University
School of Law: Applying the Law of Targeting to the Modern Battlefield (Nov. 28, 2016),
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Applying-the-Law-of-Targetingto-the-Modern-Battlefield.pdf.
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require that force be used under a law enforcement approach (i.e., detain if
possible and no direct recourse to lethal force).98
Returning to the starting point of Angosia engaging in the use of force
against the Veridian group in Betazed, Cardassia and beyond, IHRL will also
play a role in regulating the operations. If there were ongoing two-way hostilities between Angosia and the group in a new location, for example, a major camp of the group in Cardassia from which they are launching missiles,
then the co-applicability of IHRL would not prevent the use of force in accordance with the IHL framework for hostilities. The outcome may differ if,
however, Angosia intends to conduct a forcible operation against an individual or small group of individuals located in another State in which there are
no ongoing active hostilities. In such circumstances, while it may be possible
to find that IHL is applicable in principle,99 IHRL can gain predominance
and will need to be given greater weight in the planning and conduct of the
operation. IHRL does not rule out the possibility of lethal force, but it does
require a higher standard before it is employed, both with regard to a gradated approach to use of force, and by limiting it to situations of imperative
necessity to save lives.100 For example, if Cardassia is capable and ready to
detain the individuals, then not only would there be no jus ad bellum justification for the use of force, but there would also be a requirement through
IHRL to effect the detention rather than use a military operation designed
to kill.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article examined multi-territorial conflicts with armed groups through
the lens of several legal frameworks. In the realm of the jus ad bellum, the
existing body of law proves to contain the required guidelines and constraints to allow for defensive force where necessary, while preventing the
unwanted spread of conflict. This balance can be achieved once it is accepted
that self-defense can be invoked in response to armed attacks by non-State

98. This approach differs from one that may produce a similar result based on IHL
alone. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 91, sec. IX.
99. See supra Part IV.
100. Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, at 112 (1991); NIGEL S. RADLEY & MATT POLLARD, THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 253–60 (3d ed. 2009).
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actors, but that the self-defense test must be applied each time a new border
is crossed.
As for IHL, complexities included identifying the existence of armed
conflict and classifying it correctly, as well as the scope of the conflict regarding the parties and geographical location. In principle, operations in
which one side of the conflict is a non-State actor will usually be non-international armed conflicts, even if conducted outside the State’s territory. If
these operations are taking place on the territory of another State without its
consent, there will be a need to determine whether the operations have also
triggered an international armed conflict. Automatically assuming the existence of such a conflict based solely on a non-consensual forcible operation
having taken place could result in an inappropriate classification. Such determinations must be based on both the factual nature and the effects of the
operation, as well as the intent and positions of the States involved. The
scope of the conflict may widen to include new parties and the test for this
could require a different intensity threshold than the one for determining the
start of the new conflict. Nonetheless, great care should be taken in advancing support-based approaches that do not require active participation in the
hostilities themselves. The IHL framework itself does not serve to define the
geographical boundaries of the conflict. Indeed, this is a task better suited to
the jus ad bellum. However, the interplay with human rights law may mean
that in some situations in which IHL is applicable, a more restrictive paradigm for forcible operations may be required.
Multi-territorial conflicts against armed groups present a series of challenges across all relevant areas of international law. This article demonstrates
that while emerging complexities require careful analysis, none of these obstacles is insurmountable and can all be addressed within existing legal
frameworks.
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